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Distributed optimisation techniques have gained increasing attention due to fast development of autonomous robots. Many 
algorithms have been proposed to make optimisation more efficient. In this paper we propose a framework, which is based on 
probabilistic verification techniques, in order to compare the performance of various game-theoretic algorithms, in particular, 
fictitious play and its variants, after a finite number of iterations. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework, we apply 
the framework to a game which is inspired by wireless communication network problems, on five variations of fictitious play 
algorithms.   
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Distributed constrained optimisation (DCOP) tasks have 
many applications, e.g., wireless sensor networks and smart 
grid, and numerous algorithms have been used to solve 
DCOP tasks among a set of agents. In many cases, agents 
have limited coordination steps due to the nature of the task 
or communication limitations. Fictitious play is of particular 
interest as the canonical example of game-theoretic learning 
algorithms. It is known that it converges to Nash equilibrium 
in many classes of games. However, this convergence can be 
very slow. It is also possible to become trapped in cycles 
which correspond to sub-optimal rewards. 
The classical way to study these algorithms for a given game 
is to run simulations over the game. If a DCOP learning 
algorithm allows probabilistic strategies, then only one 
possible outcome can be checked in one simulation run. 
Thus a large number of simulations are needed to reveal the 
possible outcomes of a learning algorithm and to gain 
confidence in it.  Also there is no rule to specify the number 
of repetitions needed, and to guarantee that after the 
simulations every possible outcome will be discovered. 
Moreover, it is difficult to compare the general behaviour of 
two or more algorithms, e.g. how often they converge to an 
equilibrium point or to compare possible rewards of the 
players, since we do not know all the possible outcomes and 
their probability distribution. 
To attack these problems and to provide solutions, we 
propose a verification framework to analyse the behaviour 
of game-theoretic DCOP algorithms. The techniques can 
examine all possible joint actions of the agents, states of the 
world after a finite number of coordination steps between 
the agents, and how likely a joint action is observed. In 
addition, this framework can be used as a comparison tool 
for the short term performance between various DCOP 
algorithms in tasks of interest. 
2. FICTITIOUS PLAY BASED LEARNING ALGORITHMS 
2.1.  FICTITIOUS PLAY (FP) [1]  
FP is a widely used learning technique in game theory. In FP, 
each player chooses his action according to the best 
response to his beliefs about his opponents' joint mixed 
strategy. The players, after each iteration, update their 
beliefs about their opponents' strategies, and play again the 
best response according to their new beliefs. 
2.2. VARIANTS OF THAT DISCOUNT THE IMPORTANCE OF OLD 
ACTIONS 
FP is based on the implicit assumption that players use the 
same strategy in every iteration of the game. Therefore all 
the previously observed actions have the same importance. 
Geometric Fictitious Play (GFP) [2] addresses this problem by 
exponentially decaying the importance of the historical 
observations by a constant factor. Adaptive Forgetting 
Factor Fictitious Play (AFFFP) [3] instead of using a constant 
discount factor updates the discount factor in each iteration 
of the game, by using gradient accent and the likelihood of 
the previously observed action. 
2.3. VARIANTS OF FP THAT MODEL OPPONENTS’ STRATEGIES  
An alternative to discount the importance of the old actions 
is to predict opponents’ strategies. Two variants of FP, where 
players predict their opponents’ strategies and then use 
these predictions to choose an action, are Extended Kalman 
Filters Fictitious Play (EKFFP) [4] and Particle Filters Fictitious 
Play (PFFP) [5].  
3. VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK 
Our framework was inspired by probabilistic model 
checking, in particular, verification of discrete-time Markov 
chains (DTMCs) [6]. It explores every possible execution 
trace of a system to verify the probabilistic behavioural 
properties a system has. It is the first time that it is employed 
to facilitate the analysis of DCOP using game theory and 
fictitious play in particular. Our framework constructs a 
model of a DCOP game under a learning algorithm, and 
computes the probability of reaching a Nash equilibrium in 
the model. The model is composed of a set of states, and a 
set of transitions between states. The state is updated at 
each step of the game and it contains all information that 
the algorithm needs to determine the next move. A 
transition between two states is then the result of the joint 
action of the players and the environment. Each transition is 
associated with a probability determined by the algorithm, 
expressing the likelihood of choosing the corresponding joint 
action in the next move.  
One of the key issues in the development of the framework 
is how to restrain the size of a model to keep computational 
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complexity acceptable and without losing accuracy of 
coverage of the original DCOP. In principle, such a restrained 
model can be unbounded because a game can be played 
infinitely long even if a Nash equilibrium is reached. To avoid 
this, we propose behaviour similarity relation between 
states. If two states have a similar behaviour, then only one 
of them is expanded. It can be proved that the game will 
demonstrate the same behaviour from these two states, and 
thus, there is no need to explore both states, hence the 
name of the similarity relation.  Using the similarity relation, 
a compact model can be obtained in which a Nash 
equilibrium is captured by a strongly connect component 
(SCC) in the model. In addition, no transition starting from 
any state in the SCC could go to states outside the SCC. The 
sum of transition probabilities for any state is one, which 
indicates that the model is indeed a DTMC. Therefore, the 
probabilistic model checking technique for computing 
reachability probabilities on DTMCs [6] can be adopted to 
find out the probability of reaching a given Nash equilibrium. 
The proposed framework is used to make comparisons 
between the classic fictitious play algorithm (FP) and some 
of its variations: EKFFP, GFP, AFFFP and PFFP. It is worth 
emphasising that although the proposed verification 
framework is only used in a game theoretic context in this 
paper, it can be applied to any distributed optimisation 
algorithms with functions of interest that have not been cast 
as games, though this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
4. EXPERIMENTS 
The usefulness of the proposed framework can be seen even 
in the case of the simple game which is depicted in Table 1, 
where player 1 can execute action A or B, and player 2 can 
execute C or D. Joint actions (A, C) and (B, D) lead to positive 
rewards (ߙ,ߙ). This game can be seen as a collision 
avoidance game, where two UAVs are the players and they 
gain some reward if they fly at different altitudes. It can also 
be seen as a channel selection process in wireless 
communication networks, where two transmitters have to 
choose between two channels to transmit their data.   
Table 1. A simple coordination game. 





An example of the possible states that is generated from our 
framework for the FP algorithm is depicted in Fig. 1. The 
matrix in each state illustrates the possibility of choosing 
each joint action in Table 1. Fig. 2 depicts the probability that 
each of the tested algorithms has in order to converge a 
Nash equilibrium with positive rewards. This figure shows 
that EKFFP is the best learning algorithm among the ones we 
tested, for the game in Table 1. On the other hand AFFFP is 
the worst algorithm since it has the smaller chance to 
converge in one of the two pure Nash equilibria.       
 
Figure 1. The model under the FP algorithm. 
 
Figure 2. The experimental result. 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
We developed a probabilistic model checking based 
framework to study the behaviour of various game-theoretic 
learning algorithms that are based on fictitious play, and 
compared their performance. This framework can also be 
used to explore possible Nash equilibriums for robot 
cooperation in a finite number of iterations, with various 
initial conditions. The case study on a smart grid model 
shows that FP, GFP, and AFFFP are sensitive to the initial 
conditions and they can easily be trapped in non-Pareto 
efficient solutions, while EKFFP and PFFP converge more 
often to the Pareto efficient equilibrium of the game. The 
future work includes comparisons in games with various 
numbers of players, and test under our framework non-
game-theoretic algorithms for distributed optimisation. 
 
REFERENCES 
1. Brown G. W., Iterative Solutions of Games by Fictitious Play,  
1951; In Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, p. 374-
376, Wiley. 
2. Fudenberg D., Levine D. S., The Theory of Learning in Games, 
1998, The MIT Press. 
3. Smyrnakis M., Leslie, D. S., Adaptive Forgetting Factor Fictitious 
Play. 
4. Smyrnakis M., Veres, S., Coordination of Control in Robot 
Teams Using Game-theoretic Learning, IFAC, 2014. 
5. Smyrnakis M., Leslie D. S., Dynamic Opponent Modelling in 
Fictitious Play, 2010; The Computer Journal 53(9):1344-1359. 
6. Courcoubetis C., Yannakakis M., Verifying Temporal Properties 
of Finite State Probabilistic Programs, 1988; In proceedings of 
FOCS’88, p. 338-345, IEEE Computer Society Press. 
  
